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The Reliability Improvement Warranty has grown in accept-
ance as a plausible contractual method of improving field
reliability and reducing maintenance costs of military hard-
ware. The acceptance of RIWs has not been universal, however,
with many factions doubting the actual success and value of the
RIW concept. Much confusion and uncertainty clouds warranty
experimentation and more orderly progress is necessary to deter-
mine the feasibility of future RIW expansion. This study
examines the current issues of RIW development and the contro-
versy that has arisen over its use. The aspects of expanding
Reliability Improvement Warranties to shipboard equipments is
also explored. Interviews with personnel in the reliability
field, case studies and other reports are used to collect infor
mation on the facts and issues influencing the controversy. An
attempt is made to distill these facts and issues and to place
them into an orderly and understandable perspective. This is
done with the hope that the value and future of Reliability
Improvement Warranties might be more easily determined.
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The acquisition, maintenance, and manning of a modern
defense system is becoming increasingly complex and expensive,
The complexity and expense of weapons systems is not only
exceeding our treasury's ability to acquire and support them
but is also testing the ability of the military services to
maintain them. The technology of today's weapons is pushing
the state-of-the-art in electronic design and automation.
Furthermore, the advancement continues at an unbelievable
pace, allowing little opportunity for our checkbook or our
military training programs to catch up. In order to achieve
these rapid advances, the design emphasis seems to be placed
on performance rather than reliability and maintainability in
the field. In Fiscal Year 1976, the operational readiness
rates for two Navy fighters were 46.5% for the F-4 and 27.8%
for the F-14. At the same time, operation and maintenance
(0§M) costs are rising rapidly [Ref. 11:1].
This continuing problem has resulted in numerous efforts
to improve reliability and maintainability and reduce mainte-
nance costs through improved weapons system design. The
technique used by many Defense Acquisition Agencies to "buy"
reliability is a warranty clause, popularly known as a
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW)
.

B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Over the past ten years, the RIW has grown in acceptance
as a plausible contractual method of improving reliability
and saving maintenance costs of weapon systems. This accept-
ance has not been uniform, however, with many factions doubting
the actual success and continued usefulness of the concept.
Within the Navy, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has
been the sole developer and user of the RIW. Other procure-
ment agencies and higher level officials continue to hold
reservations concerning the merits of the RIW.
The purpose of this study was to examine the current
issues in RIW development and usage and to organize the facts
and impressions focusing on the future of RIW expansion. It is
perceived that much confusion and uncertainty clouds the RIW
experimentation and that more orderly progress is necessary
to determine the possibility of future RIW expansion. If
the facts and issues can be distilled from the surrounding
confusion and placed into an orderly and understandable per-
spective, the value and future of RIW development may be
more easily determined.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The original research question of this study centered
around the feasibility of expanding the RIW concept into ship-
board systems. Early research efforts revealed that a much
broader question remained unanswered, upon which shipboard
application might ultimately rest. Therefore, the thrust

of the research was revised. The primary research question
of this study is: "Can the RIW concept be expected to accom-
plish the goals or results for which it is intended?" In
attempting to answer this question, additional questions were
addressed. What is the concept of RIW and its definition?
What are the goals of the RIW? What examples can be analyzed
to provide future decision making alternatives?
Since much controversy still remains regarding the actual
value of RIWs for accomplishing the desired results at a
beneficial cost, the question of expansion into new areas of
application appears premature. If the RIW is proven ineffec-
tive or not cost effective, the question of expansion becomes
moot. However, since research into the RIW issues uncovered
some interesting facts on the narrower subject, the feasibility
of shipboard application remained a secondary objective.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this research effort remained within the
framework of the Navy and its particular aspects of RIW
development. However, the Army and Air Force have provided
much of the RIW research and contributions to the available
literature. For this reason, many of the experiences and
conclusions used in assembling this study were drawn from
the other Services. Where possible, this material was
applied toward the Navy aspects of the problems addressed.
This study was not intended to be exhaustive in all
areas of warranties. Many facets of RIW research and many
10

unanswered questions were not explored. Only those matters
pertaining to the objectives of this study were examined in
depth. Because of this, additional research into specific
areas or programs might modify views or conclusions presented
herein.
A problem related to RIW research was a lack of available
literature. Considering the length of time since the first
RIW (1967) , and the large amount of publicity given to the
concept, the scope of literature available is considered to
be very specialized on a few issues! Many studies and
reports used by this researcher were found to be collections
of information from previous literature and many were con-
sidered outdated for the purposes of this research.
This thesis assumes the reader has an understanding of
the concept of warranties. Although background information is
provided as part of this document, the reader will improve
his comprehension of the issues presented here if the primary
literature referenced is reviewed.
E. METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis was accomplished primarily
through literature review and interviews/discussions with
personnel involved or potentially involved in RIW policy and
operations
.
1 . Literature Review
The literature search began with a Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) screen of warranty and
11

reliability improvement warranty descriptors. This proved to
be of limited assistance, providing only background and
historical information. Many of the references received from
DLSIE were simply outdated. Many contracted studies have
been done by ARINC Research Corporation. Their reports were
valuable in obtaining data and statistics for specific warran
ties and warranty studies. Mr. Harold Balaban is one of
ARINC s current experts on RIW and authored several reports.
The Rand Corporation also completed a study for the Air Force
in 1977. The report of that study, Reliability Improvement
Warranty for Military Procurement
,
was used extensively,
particularly for its convincing opposition to RIWs
.
Within the Navy, NAVAIR and the Navy Aviation Supply
Office (ASO) have produced most of the written material on
the RIW. The files at Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) and
Mr-. Oscar Markowitz of ASO yielded much of the Navy-related
material. Mr. Markowitz proved to be a wealth of RIW
knowledge. Particularly interesting was the referenced MID
Contract Review of the ASO warranty contract with Abex
Corporation, authored by Mr. Markowitz. Other very valuable
sources of policy and planning information were internal
memoranda within the Department of Defense, Department of the
Navy and the Tri-Service Reliability Support Incentives
Group [Ref. 15:1].
This material served to provide extensive background
information on RIW development and an understanding of the
basic RIW issues. It armed this researcher with the ability
12

to hold intelligent discussions and interviews with personnel
directly involved in RIW matters.
2. Interviews and Discussions
In-depth research of the current controversy and
issues concerning the RIW required direct contact with the
personnel involved. To accomplish this, a two-week fact-
finding trip was made to Washington, D.C. Contact was
established with the NAVMAT Reliability and Maintainability
Office which acted as the coordinator for the visit.
The first interviews were held with four engineers at
NAVAIR. These interviews consisted of unstructured discussions
from 30 minutes to two hours in length. The purpose of the
NAVAIR interviews was to discuss general RIW management and
problems with people who had "hands on" RIW experience at
the operational level. These interviews provided excellent
detail regarding practical problems and advantages of RIW use.
The next series of discussions were held with the
reliability staff at NAVMAT. They tended to be both formal
and informal since the research was being conducted from
that office. The NAVMAT contact provided insight into the
foundations for current policy (or lack of it) and future
Navy involvement.
Finally, efforts were turned toward NAVSEA where
interviews were held with six Reliability Group personnel.
Naval Sea Systems Command contains three sections which have
reliability and maintainability responsibility: Surface,
Combat Systems and Undersea. The Combat Systems group proved
13

to be the most lucrative contact within NAVSEA. Discussions
with the NAVSEA people centered around the various equipments
managed by the groups, the working organization within each
group, and possible RIW application to the equipments. Since
NAVSEA had little actual experience with the RIW, these
interviews were held last to give this researcher the advantage
of information gained at the other commands.
In addition to the Washington fact-finding visit,
telephone interviews were conducted throughout the research
effort. Other organizations contacted included: Navy
Aviation Supply Office, Air Force Systems Command Headquarters,
Army Material Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
,
and ARINC Research Corporation.
F. DEFINITIONS
Much of the confusion surrounding the RIW controversy
focuses on definitions for the various warranties. For this
reason, careful attention must be given to the definition
intended when applying a name to a particular warranty type
or clause.
1 . Classic Definitions
a. Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW).
The often quoted definition for RIW is stated as:
The contractor is provided with monetary incentive
throughout the period of the warranty, to improve the pro-
duction design and engineering of the equipment so as to
enhance the field/operational reliability and maintaina-
bility of the system/equipment; and
14

The contractor agrees that, during a specified or
measured period of time, he will repair or replace (with-
in a specified turn-around time) all equipment that fails
(specified to subject exclusion, if applicable) [Ref. 18:5].
b. Failure Free Warranty (FFW)
The original term given to the RIW concept. It was
later considered a misnomer since it was not a warranty against
failure [Ref. 12:16].
c. Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) Guarantee
A MTBF guarantee requires a manufacturer to
guarantee that a stated mean-time -between- failure will be
experienced in operation. Failure to meet a guaranteed level
requires corrective action by the contractor. An MTBF guaran-
tee is often procured in association with an RIW [Ref. 4:2-7].
d. Reliability Assurance Warranty (RAW)
This term was developed by NAVAIR to distinguish
it from the RIW in cases where reliability growth (improve-
ment) is not required [Ref. 12:16].
e. Long Term Warranty (LTW)
A contractual provision which includes the con-
cepts of RIW and RAW. Under an LTW, the contractor is bound
by a firm fixed-price contract and is responsible for repair
or replacement of a defective item within a specified turn-
around time. He is also encouraged to identify and effect
engineering changes in order to improve product reliability
and maintainability in the fleet [Ref. 13:1].
2 . Terminology Problems
Many of the problems encountered in discussing
warranties were caused by misleading impressions and judgments
15

created by current terms. The most common term subject to
misinterpretation was the word "improvement" in Reliability
Improvement Warranty. It was often associated with "get well"
programs resulting from poor engineering development or
government supervision. Although this was the purpose for
the original RIW contract, the RIW has grown into a much
broader concept. The NAVAIR term, Long-Term Warranty, was
an attempt to circumvent the widespread terminology confusion.
One NAVAIR interviewee stated that "...you must structure
each individual warranty to accomplish the desired result in
that particular application" [Ref . 3]
.
3 . Warranty Definition
Regardless of the terminology used (RIW, RAW, LTW,
FFW, MTBF Guarantee) , the basic Reliability Improvement
Warranty is a fixed-price, long-term repair contract. For the
purposes of this thesis, the term RIW will be used in reference
to all contractual warranty types (except standard commercial
warranties) unless otherwise specified. The definition used
is the Department of Defense definition quoted during an
interview. That definition is as follows: "(An RIW is) a
system where the contractor is incentivized or penalized
for reliability performance in the field" [Ref. 4].
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II presents the objective of applying the RIW
concept to acquisitions. Basic guidelines for determining
when an RIW should be considered are provided and the process
16

of fitting the RIW planning into the acquisition cycle is
outlined. Chapter II gives a brief history of RIW development
and a synopsis of the Navy applications of RIWs . Chapter IV
reviews policies of applicable Navy organizations and
summarizes recent studies which have influenced those policies
Chapter V discusses the important major issues affecting RIW
expansion. This includes viewpoints on the effectiveness of
the RIW gathered from literature and interviews and a look
at possibilities for shipboard application of RIWs. Chapter
VI presents conclusions drawn from the research, recommenda-
tions for improvement of RIW experimentation, and observations




A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY
The warranty or guarantee concept has its roots in the
commercial sector, the Uniform Sales Act of 1906 being the
source of warranty-law principles. The original objective
of the commercial warranty was to provide protection to the
consumer in that he is entitled to receive the product and
quality that is expected. Although the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975 have updated
the warranty laws since then, the basic objective has remained
unchanged.
Although the RIW concept is based upon basic warranty
principles, the objectives have evolved into more than con-
sumer protection. This evolution has occasionally caused mis-
understanding and misguided assessments of the RIW approach.
The original efforts with RIWs were to select equipment which
was demonstrating poor field reliability and try to improve
it through the fixed-fee repair contract approach. The
philosophy then shifted from one of fixing a product once
it is proven to be bad to one of trying to build it right the
first time. This started the movement of RIW application
earlier in the acquisition cycle [Ref. 7:4].
Two other warranty objectives of the RIW have been voiced.
It may be viewed simply as an insurance policy providing
enforceable protection against poor reliability or it may be
18

viewed as a device to motivate contractor behavior of per-
formance [Ref. 11:9]. It is the motivational aspects of the
RIW usage that have evolved into the generally accepted prime
objectives
.
The confusion surrounding the purpose and objectives of
RIW development became apparent at the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) level when
the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA)
addressed concerns in RIW application [Ref. 8:1]. As a result,
ASN (M,RA§L) issued clarification of RIW objectives, stating,
"...the principal objective in applying RIWs is to incentivize
contractors to design and produce reliable equipment" [Ref.
2:1].
B. GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION
Early in the development of RIW mechanics and administra-
tion, it was recognized that to be successful, RIWs had to be
selectively applied. The Air Force was the first military
organization to compile and promulgate a list of application
criteria to be used as guidelines in considering RIW use.
Although other organizations have since published application
criteria, all such publications have been essentially based
upon the Air Force list [Ref. 18:9], The Air Force criteria
include
:
1. A warranty can be obtained at a reasonable price,
commensurate with the value of the warranty work.
2. Moderate to high support costs are involved.
19

3. The equipment is readily transportable or can be
field-serviced by the contractor.
4. The equipment is self-contained, immune from failures
induced by other units, and has easily defined failure
characteristics
.
5. The equipment application in terms of expected
operating time and environment are known.
6. The equipment is susceptible to being contracted for
on a fixed-price basis with form, fit, and function stipulated
when practical.
7. The contract can be structured to provide coverage
for a period of three to five years
.
8. The equipment has a potential for both reliability
growth and reduction in repair costs.
9. Potential contractors show a willingness toward
acceptance of an RIW.
C. RIW AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The motivation desired from RIW application is most
effective when the warranty is considered as early as possible
in the system's life cycle. A decision to use a warranty
will affect equipment configuration and design as well as
the planning needed to maintain and support the warranted
item. Figure 1 shows how warranty-related activities inter-
face with the system development cycle for major system pro-
curements. The text provided below was condensed from the
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1. Alternative Concept Exploration Phase
During the conceptual phase, the system is considered
in very general terms. Background studies may be conducted
on reliability and maintainability and the expected life
cycle costs. Warranties should be considered in these studies,
along with other means of achieving reliability and main-
tainability goals.
2. Validation and Demonstration Phase
The validation phase begins with the decision that
the capabilities of the proposed system are needed; that a
program office should be established; and that resources
should be expended on technical and cost analysis, engineer-
ing design, and further system definition. The consideration
for reliability and maintainability requirements should be
included. It is not only important to consider requirements
but also how reliability and maintainability can best be
achieved. It is at this point that a potential system
developer should be made aware if the RIW is being considered
since it may affect initial design efforts. It is recommended
that the Request for Proposal (RPP) for the Full-Scale Engineer-
ing Development Phase (FSED) contain discussion of possible
warranty provisions during production. Activities related
to the RIW include
:
a. Initial screening of RIW criteria.
b. Economic analysis to determine the economic
feasibility of a warranty.
c. Development of basic warranty provisions.
22

d. Fiscal planning to include RIW funding
requirements
.
e. Incorporation of possible warranty provisions
into the FSED RFP.
f. Proposal review in relation to RIW provisions of
the RFP.
g. Development of final RIW provisions.
3. Full-Scale Engineering Development Phase
During the FSED phase, the system is designed,
assembled and tested to determine if the required operational
capability can be achieved within allowable costs. Also,
better estimates of system reliability and maintenance
support parameters become available. Warranty provisions
can also be updated. At the end of FSED, warranty proposals
provided by the contractors are evaluated and a final decision
can be made to utilize a warranty. Specific warranty steps
include
:
a. Update of warranty feasibility studies.
b. Development of final warranty provisions.
c. Incorporation of warranty provisions in the
production RFP.
d. Proposal review with respect to production
proposal warranty response.
e. Warranty decisions.
4. Production and Deployment Phase
With the decision to proceed with production, a
number of warranty administration tasks are required. The
major tasks are listed below:
23

a. Development of item-management procedures.
b. Establishment of plan for user indoctrination of
processing warranted equipment.
c. Coordination of in-plant inspection requirements.
d. Development and employment of the data system
required by the warranty.
e. Coordination of contract administration require-
ments
.
f. Engineering change proposal (ECP) processing.
g. Contractor maintenance facilities review.







The concept of RIW was first applied in 1967 by the
airline industry. Pan American Airlines became concerned
about reliability risks associated with the purchase of the
new Boeing 747 aircraft. In order to attain reasonable
support costs for their newly acquired 747s, Pan Am was
willing to pay their vendors a fixed amount per flying hour
to pass the risk of high support costs. This "total product
support" concept incentivized Pan Am's suppliers to build
reliability into the aircraft and to improve it throughout
the warranty period [Ref. 17:11],
By 1973, product support agreements purchased by Pan Am
included MTBF guarantees. The guarantee provided that speci-
fied MTBFs would be achieved by the end of the warranty period
If the specified MTBF was not met, the vendor was required to
provide additional spares to Pan Am at no additional cost
[Ref. 17:12].
In 1967, Lear Siegler, Inc. (LSI) approached the Navy
with a RlW-type proposal. Prior to 1967, LSI had been repair-
ing the Navy's 2171 gyroscope used in the A-4 and F-4 aircraft
The repairs had been performed on a cost basis. LSI proposed
that a fixed-price, long-term contract be established to over-
haul the gyros. This was termed a Failure Free Warranty.
The Navy accepted the LSI proposal and a 1500-operating-hour/
25

five-year contract was established covering 800 of the 3200
gyro population. The contract price was approximately three
million dollars. It was considered successful enough that
in 1973, it was renewed for an additional 1500 operating
hours or six years. The success of this first RIW will be
examined in greater depth in a later chapter. However, it was
the improvement in reliability of approximately 331 that
attracted a great deal of interest within DOD.
The next military RIW was established by the Air Force
with LSI in 1969. It covered the F-lll gyroscope for 3000
operating hours or five years. Problems developed with this
warranty which made evaluation difficult. The F-lll aircraft
experienced difficulties which greatly reduced flying hours
and gyro utilization, and the gyro population never reached
expected numbers. This warranty is also examined as a case
study in a later chapter.
The Air Force and NAVAIR continued with limited warranty
application. Warranties were purchased for the AN/APN-194
radio altimeter and the AN/ARN-99 (V-l) OMEGA receiver by
NAVAIR. The Air Force applied its second RIW to the AN/
ARN-106 TACAN System. In March of 1973, Rome Air Development
Center let a $28,000.00 contract to ARINC Research Corporation
for a four-month study of the potential benefits of using
reliability-related warranty agreements in defense avionics
procurements. Based upon the airline experience and four
military warranties, that study recommended the expanded use
26

of RlW-type warranties [Ref. 5:61]. Since that time, ARINC
has continued to be instrumental in shaping RIW development.
As RIW use continued, the DOD Tri-Services Reliability
and Support Incentives Group determined that a Warranty
Information Center (WIC) was needed to document and make use
of the warranty experiences. It was decided that a "pilot"
center should be established to answer the many questions about
the center's purpose and operation. On 1 July 1976, ARINC
Research Corporation was awarded a nine-month contract to
establish the pilot WIC. The work was completed between
1 July 1976 and 31 March 1977. The resulting report
recommended that a WIC be established on a permanent basis
[Ref. 10:1]. That recommendation was never implemented.
After the WIC experiment, the services continued RIW
utilization rather independently with the Tri-Services
Reliability and Support Incentives Group playing a monitoring
role. The Navy's RIW efforts have been concentrated within
NAVAIR, which has continued to let warranty contracts when
possible
.
B. NAVY RIW CONTRACTS
In order to provide insight as to the scope of the RIW
program within the Navy, the RIW contracts which have been
let or considered are listed. A brief synopsis also provides
background information.
1. 2171 Gyroscope
a. Contractor: Lear-Siegler , Inc.
b. Dates: 1967, 1970, 1973.
27

c. Costs of Warranty: $3 million (1967 contract).
d. Synopsis: The 1967 contract was the original
RIW contract for DOD. Additional contracts have been let,
continuing RIW coverage for the gyros.
2. AN/APN-194 Altimeter
a. Contractor: Honeywell.
b. Dates: 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977
c. Cost of Warranty: $976,603.00 (1977 contract).
d. Synopsis: This equipment has been purchased
under seven RIW contracts. The first 514 were short in
duration while the latest covers a period of five years
after the delivery of the last unit. Various equipment
components also have operating-hour stipulations attached.
3. APN-154
a. Contractor (s) : Honeywell and UTE Corp.
b. Dates: 1972, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978.
c. Cost of Warranty: (Various).
d. Synopsis: The first four contracts had limited
two- to three-year RIWs. The 1978 contract provides five-
year RIW coverage. The early RIWs produced considerable
product improvement. Results from the latest contract were
not yet available.
4. F-14 Hydraulic Pump
a. Contractor: ABEX Corp.
b. Date: 1973 (original delivery).
c. Cost of Warranty: $1,595,344.00.
28

d. Synopsis: The original contract has been amended
to include each new production lot of F-14 aircraft. The
terminal date is currently 1983. This contract has been
rated as highly successful by NAVAIR.
5. AV-8A Hydraulic Pump
a. Contractor: Vickers , Inc.
b. Date: 1976.
c. Cost of Warranty: $35,000.00.
d. Synopsis: The purchase contract provides hydraulic
pumps to be retrofitted to an AV-8A aircraft. No warranty
results were available at the time of this study.
6. AN/ARN-99 (V) 1 and 4 (OMEGA)
a. Contractor: Nortronics
.
b. Dates: 1972, 1974, 1975.
c. Cost of Warranty: $2.9 million (1972), $1.7
million (1974), $1.8 million (1975).
d. Synopsis: These contracts provided short one- and
two-year warranty periods. Reliability improvement was
accomplished on a consistent basis to the point that the




Variable Speed Constant Frequency Generator
a. Contractor(s) : Naval Air Rework Facility,
Pensacola.
b. Dates: 1973, 1975, 1976.
c. Cost of Warranty: $209,000.00 (1973), $120,000.00




d. Synopsis: Warranty provided a minimum coverage
of 18 months after delivery unless repeated failures occurred;
then coverage was extended to 36 months. The MTBF per flight
hour increased from 76 to over 400. Warranty coverage has
expired on most units.
8. CH53E Automatic Flight Control Computer
a. Contractor: Hamilton Standard (through Sikorsky).
b. Date: Option developed 1975, exercised 1977.
c. Cost of Warranty: $55,000.00 (Est.).
d. Synopsis: Warranty coverage continues five years
after delivery to Sikorsky. Field information was not avail-
able at the time of this study.
9. AN/AYK-14 (V) Standard Airborne Computer
a. Contractor: Honeywell.
b. Date: 1976.
c. Cost of Warranty: (20% of hardware cost -- not
fully priced)
.
d. Synopsis: Warranty is for five years on a
specified number of operating hours, depending upon module.
The warranty option of the procurement contract has not yet
been exercised.
10. LTN-72 Inertial Navigation Set
a. Contractor: Litton Systems, Inc.
b. Dates: 1977.
c. Cost of Warranty: $496,620.00.
d. Synopsis: The LTN-72 is a commercial system
used extensively by commercial airlines. The contract is a
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firm fixed-price repair contract with scheduled improvement
goals. However, the contractor is incentivized to reduce
maintenance requirements to increase profits.
11. AN/ASN-92 (CAINS)
a. Contractor: Litton.
b. Date: (Contract to be awarded).
c. Cost of Warranty: (To be negotiated).
d. Synopsis: The contract is expected to be a five-
year maintenance warranty contract for repair of approximately
900 systems.
12. Harpoon
a. Contractor: McDonnell Douglas.
b. Date: 1976.
c. Cost of Warranty: $4.3 million (through FY-78).
d. Synopsis: The Harpoon RIW resulted from a
SECNAV directive that an RIW be included in the contract.
The warranty develops through four phases as delivery is
accomplished and repair facilities are established. Repair
efforts will be based on the failure of periodic built-in-
test (BIT) results of deployed missiles.
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IV. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES CONCERNING RIWS
The current perspectives of RIWs in the Navy today fill
a broad spectrum of policies, recommendations and theories.
The research and presentation of these wide-ranging opinions,
some substantiated and others not, require a multi-faceted
approach. This chapter will present the material which is
necessary to consider the position of the RIW in the Navy
at the time of this writing.
The materials considered pertinent include studies
which were currently influential: policy documents, letters,
and memoranda reflecting present guidelines; and the opinions
and comments of personnel in management and technical roles.
A. CONTRACTED AND NAVY RESEARCH STUDIES
A number of research studies on the subject of RIWs
have been performed by military activities and research
institutions under military contract. iMany have produced
findings and recommendations which have been superseded or
are otherwise outdated, and many are repetitive. Two of
these studies were chosen as being currently influential and
pertinent to the thrust of this thesis and are presented
below. Although many considerations in these and other
studies and reports have been drawn upon, an understanding
of the impact provided by these recent studies is important.
Therefore, a brief summary is provided herein.
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1. Establishment and Operation of a Pilot Warranty
Information Center
The ARINC Research Corporation published a report in
April 1977 on a pilot warranty information center which they
established and operated for a two-month period as mentioned
earlier.
The purpose of the center was to collect RIW informa-
tion, analyze it, and provide results to the military services
for further RIW development. ARINC, in its report, determined
that the information was needed to [Ref. 10:2-2]:
a. Establish warranty policies and procedures.
b. Evaluate the effectiveness of warranties.
c. Develop warranty application guidelines.
d. Apply warranty application guidelines by analyzing
and recommending whether RIW should be applied to particular
planned procurements.
e. Structure warranty provisions and decide which
provisions, if any, should be incorporated into contracts.
f. Define and resolve general problem areas such
as administrative, funding, and legal aspects of a warranty.
g. Identify specific problems experienced in on-
going RIW contracts to prevent their occurrence in future
procurements
.
h. Support special warranty studies to expand and
improve the application of warranties.
The warranty information center was operated during
February and March 1977; 59 requests for information were
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received and filled. Data on 18 warranties were collected and








f. RIW terminology guide.
g. RIW bibliography.
A critique form was provided to all customers making
requests for products to aid in evaluation of the center.
Responses were mixed with overall comments being favorable.
Recommendations included [Ref. 10:6-10]:
a. "Performance information is needed on more
contracts and in more detail."
b. "Reports cited in the bibliography should be
available from the center on a centralized basis."
c. "You appear to be collecting information already
available in DOD. What is needed is collection of more data
and evaluation of these data to provide 'lessons learned'
relative to RIW applications."
The ARINC Report made a number of recommendations.
The primary thrust of these recommendations was to continue
the center on a test basis to collect and analyze data.
Since that time, the center has not been reestablished.
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2. NAVAIR Study Report on RIW Policy and Implementation
The objective of this study was to investigate the
suitability of Reliability Improvement Warranties for NAVAIR
applications. Through extensive historical comparisons of
Army, Navy, and Air Force data, literature reviews, and
interviews, this study details many pages of findings and
recommendations. Many of these findings apply to internal
NAVAIR management and policies of RIW programs and will not
be considered in this thesis. However, those considered broad
enough in scope or having significant external ramifications
are provided (Ref* 12:18]:
a. There is no centralized source of collected RIW
data and information at NAVAIR. There are pockets of warranty
expertise and information but gaps exist that should be
bridged.
b. The RIW concept is not yet universally accepted
by the R§M community.
c. There is a lack of management commitment to
controlled RIW experimentation in the Navy. No organization
has taken a leadership role in directing and shaping the RIW
programs so as to assess the actual value to the Navy.
d. The RIW program is not an urgent requirement nor
a crash effort. However, it deserves more management atten-
tion and disciplined approach than it is now getting.
e. The implementation of RIWs by the military
establishment has primarily been with contractors having
commercial airline warranty experience. This has undoubtedly
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aided in the success of the applications and may be a partial
explanation as to why NAVSEA and NAVELEX have not progressed
significantly with RIWs.
f. The specifics of warranty contracts are extremely
flexible and can be adapted to fit any number of equipments
or situations. However, this necessitates great care to
ensure that RIW provisions are not applied disproportionately
to either the government or the contractor.
g. Both the Army and the Air Force report that
contractor efforts to improve profits by withholding relia-
bility during development to allow for greater reliability
improvement after deployment have been neither detected nor
suspected.
The consideration provided in the following assessment
by the NAVAIR report is one that was expressed by many people
in many organizations.
It is still too early to tell if RIW is right for
NAVAIR. Even the Army and the Air Force, who have made
management commitments to RIW, are not prepared to
answer if RIW is a viable procurement method. Not
enough experience has really been accumulated and evalu-
ated. In concept, RIW is desirable. In practice, it
has appeared to be successful. However, it has taken
dedicated efforts to properly structure and administer
RIW programs as it is a new concept and still evolving.
The myriad of details involved in RIW are much more subtle
and complex than might be assumed from a simple "fixed
fee multi-year repair contract" [Ref. 12:49].
B. THE RIW CLIMATE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND NAVY
COMMANDS
Representatives of the Department of Defense, Office of
the Secretary of the Navy, and the Navy's Systems Commands
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have expressed varied attitudes and opinions on the subject
of the RIW. A review of these policies and opinions (or lack
thereof) was made in order to present a proper perspective
of RIWs. Where official policy directives were available,
they were utilized. However, when written policy was not
available, the information was obtained through interviews
or discussions with personnel in the various commands. There-
fore, much of the "policy" is not from official channels
but rather is constructed from organizational practice.
1. Department of Defense
The Department of Defense has displayed renewed
interest in RIW development. On 14 November 1978, the Under-
secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) sent a memorandum
to each service requesting information to enable joint evalua-
tion of the impact of the RIW program. The memo requested
that each service provide a description of the current status
of RIW contracts within that service, an analysis of the
effectiveness of this type of warranty, and an assessment of
desirability for a joint collection and analysis center for
warranty information. The responses to this memo were
provided to DOD but have not been released. A long-time
activist in military RIW involvement and a former chairman
of the Tri-Services Reliability and Support Incentives Group
provided some insight into the responses submitted by the
Army and Air Force. According to this source, the Air Force
displayed guarded optimism and recommended establishment of a
joint information center, while the Army was less optimistic
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and did not recommend a joint center. He also commented on
the policy of the Department toward the RIW, stating that
it "...is a trial application, still being evaluated." He
further implied that while pilot programs are still being
evaluated, DOD has neither restricted nor encouraged the
establishment of additional warranties [Ref . 4]
.
2. Naval Material Command
Contact with the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT)
was made through the Reliability and Maintainability Office.
This office is responsible for providing policy to, and
monitoring the performance of, the Navy's Systems Commands in
the area of reliability and maintainability (R§M) for their
systems procurements. No written policy regarding Reliability
Improvement Warranties was available from NAVMAT; however,
extensive discussions with these personnel indicated a negative
attitude toward the RIW as a viable method of improving field
reliability. The Director of the R§M office did express
some viewpoints which tend to govern the attitude of the command
He stated:
My policy is that I am not against warranties or
guarantees if we can get them (from contractors)
.
Reliability Improvement Warranties (in the strict
definition) are current "gimmicks" with which some think
we get something for nothing. Others think we get
nothing for something (with RIWs) . I think (RIWs) are
somewhere in between [Ref. 10]
.
He also expressed his opinion that future electronic
systems will be less and less subject to reliability growth.
Continuing advancements in micro-electronics, he suspects,
will make repair of electronic modules impractical. He can
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visualize systems in the near future where "entire computers
will be unplugged from a circuit card, replaced, and tossed
into the trash can" [Ref. 10].
The prevailing attitude among the engineers in the
R$M office was that the RIW connotated that a system
initially was not designed properly. "Put the money up
front to design a system properly and you won't need an RIW,"
was a quote often heard. In response to the increased
recognition of the need to improve field reliability in Naval
systems, NAVMAT has launched its own program to accomplish
that improvement. Termed by some as the "New Look" in
reliability and maintainability, this program deserves
coverage in a study of RIWs because it is an alternative to
such warranties. As described by the NAVMAT reliability
engineers, the "New Look" approach places more attention on
building reliability into a system, rather than improving
reliability once the system is deployed. This is accomplished
through design efforts, component selection, quality control,
and improved test and evaluation techniques. Direct Government
involvement and additional development funding in the "New
Look" program replace the motivative influence of long-term
repair commitments in RIW programs. The Navy's F-18 aircraft
is the first major system being procured under the "New Look"
program.
3 . Naval Air Systems Command
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and their




have been the Navy's only active users of RIWs . Since the
first military RIW contract, developed by ASO, NAVAIR has
considered the warranty a workable contracting tool to reduce
life cycle costs and improve field reliability. The NAVAIR
and ASO have developed rather advanced warranty techniques
and are in the process of promulgating internal RIW policies
and working guidance. An ASO field instruction provides
special procedures for the shipment, receipt, and reporting
of equipment under RIW contracts [Ref. 16:1]. The Naval Air
Systems Command is drafting an instruction which, when
o
complete, will provide policy guidance and assign respon-
sibility for determining the need for, and applying on a
trial basis, Long-Term Warranty (LTW) provisions [Ref. 13:1].
The policy of NAVAIR is to apply the LTW concept on
an experimental basis to contracts for the procurement,
modification, or repair of weapons systems, equipment, or
components whenever it is determined to be advantageous.
The instruction also states that the "application of an
LTW does not negate the need for good configuration management
and sound R§M design and development fundamentals" [Ref.
13:2]
.
Discussion with NAVAIR personnel revealed a generally
high regard for the RIWs with which they have had close
contact. The Director of the Navigation and Instrumentation
Branch was one of the most adament and experienced supporters
of the RIW. It was his firm opinion that contractors must
be incentivized, through profits, to ensure maximum reliability
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of their products. He considered the requirement for a
contractor to repair his products, through warranty, an
excellent method of equating reliability with profit
[Ref. 3].
This positive attitude toward warranties was exempli-
fied throughout the interviews with NAVAIR personnel. The
primary problems with expanded RIW usage concerning the NAVAIR
organization were those of internal warranty planning and
administration. Specifically, "Who should perform what
functions?" and "Who makes which decisions?" According to
the author of the NAVAIR Instruction, those problems were
being worked out and would be included in a slight revision
to their draft instruction [Ref. 8]
.
4. Naval Sea Systems Command
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has yet to
enter into the RIW area on an active basis. The only written
reference to the RIW which could be found by this researcher
appeared in a proposed Program Support Agreement with the
Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC). In this document,
two passages refer to RIWs as follows [Ref. 14:9]:
SPCC will assure that reliability, maintainability,
quality, configuration control, value engineering, life
cycle cost (including Reliability Improvement Warranties)
are incorporated in appropriate procurements for ship-
board material.
SPCC will have the responsibility to identify items
which can provide logistics, life cycle cost and readi-
ness advantages utilizing Failure Free Warranty (FFW/
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) procurement
techniques. SPCC will provide annual budgetary estimates
for the implementation of FFW/RIW, make cost effectiveness
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studies and coordinate with the contractors until viable,
cost effective proposals are available. The proposals
shall be coordinated with NAVSEA for approval and funding.
Upon approval, SPCC shall obtain appropriate contract
coverage and supervise achievement of contract objectives.
This reference to warranty application in a Support
Agreement between SPCC and Naval Sea Systems Command has not
actually been promulgated. Such responsibility being placed
upon Ships Parts Control Center would significantly enlarge
its mission and require additional staffing. This and other
problems have prevented the proposed agreement from being
approved.
Notwithstanding the above, NAVSEA has no written RIW
policy and has been very reluctant to participate in warranty
development. A NAVSEA representative accurately summarized
their attitude by saying, "(NAVSEA is) not recommending RIWs
for shipboard use" [Ref. 6], A number of valid problems to
shipboard use of RIWs influence the negative approach by
NAVSEA which will be covered in detail in a later section.
C . SUMMARY
Chapter IV examined the organizational attitudes,
approaches and policies of the Department of Defense and,
more specifically, applicable major commands of the Navy.
Section A presented brief summaries of two major studies
which have strongly influenced RIW opinions and advancement.
The first is a report on the Warranty Information Center to
improve the basic knowledge of RIW application and provide
that knowledge to requesting organizations. The second
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study was conducted for the purpose of investigating the
suitability of RIWs for NAVAIR and concluded that the RIW
was a desirable concept but that additional effort was
required to fully understand the complexities of its develop-
ment.
Section B reviewed the policies and approaches of DOD
and major Navy commands. DOD has renewed its interest in
trial applications of RIWs as an effort to reduce military
spending. The Naval Material Command has not produced policy
directives on its usage and has not presented an official
stance on the RIW issue. The NAVMAT Reliability Office is
favoring the "new look" approach of improving engineering
through directly funded, intensified engineering development
and product testing. The NAVAIR has initiated RIW application
and has developed the Navy's base of expertise in this area.
It has further drafted a comprehensive instruction on RIW
policy and application. The NAVSEA has recognized the
existence of RIWs but has not applied such a warranty to
any acquisitions. A program support agreement with SPCC
specifies that SPCC should consider RIWs in its procurements.
Chapter V will examine various factors and opinions
concerning the actual effectiveness of RIWs and the aspects
of expanding its application to shipboard systems.
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V. MAJOR RIW ISSUES
The future of Reliability Improvement Warranties in the
Navy and the entire Department of Defense is a very contro-
versial subject. Disagreement can be found regarding almost
every major RIW consideration. Each major Command or Depart-
ment has both proponents and opponents of RIWs. In approaching
the authoritative and knowledgeable people in the various
organizations with the basic research questions of this study,
many valid arguments and concerns were raised on both sides
of the issue. These positions are the center of the current
overall RIW controversy and should be examined.
Two broad areas of concern became the focal point of
the research effort: the ability of the RIW to accomplish
its intended purposes and the suitability of expanding RIW
experimentation into shipboard systems.
A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RIWs
The policies and actions of the major commands affected
by RIW development reflect the most fundamental and deep-
rooted controversy of the RIW subject. Is RIW a valid concept
for accomplishing the objectives for which it is designed?
Many arguments can be made for either a "yes" or "no" answer
to this question.
This section of Chapter V will present three basic view-
points from which to examine the question of RIW effectiveness.
The first will be the commercial foundation on which the
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military organization adopted the RIW concept; second, various
viewpoints of members of the Navy's reliability community
will be compared; and third, four brief case studies will be
presented. Although many other questions of RIW application,
administration, funding, and specifications also remain
unanswered, the basic effectiveness must first be determined
to some degree of satisfaction.
1 . Commercial versus Military Application of RIWs
a. The Commercial Basis for Warranties
The basis for warranty development originated in
the commercial marketplace and has grown through commercial
laws and regulations. The military's use of warranties to
motivate contractors to improve the reliability of products
has often been justified on the basis that (1) consumer
product warranties have provided the customer with a more
reliable or higher quality product, and (2) warranties shift
the risk of repair or replacement costs from the buyer to the
manufacturer. Both assumptions are generally incorrect
[Ref. 11:38]. Generally they have been used as a promotional
device or as a protective device to limit liability through
exclusions and disclaimers. In either case, warranties pro-
tect the seller's interests more than the consumer's [Ref.
11:35] .
The standard automobile warranty is a familiar
example of this theory. The Federal Trade Commission
published a "Staff Report on Automobile Warranties" in 1968.
This report concluded [Ref. 11:36]:
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(1) The industry deliberately over-sold its
improved warranty in the 1960s, creating the impression
that "higher levels of engineering and manufacturing skill"
had overcome the complexity of the automobile.
(2) Warranty extensions had no correlation
with quality or developments in engineering and manufacturing.
(3) Quality control and warranty performance
were declining.
b. Commercial Airline Avionics
Chapter III pointed out that the first RlW-type
warranty was used by the commercial airline industry. The
airlines continued to develop the concept and have put it to
successful use. It is the airlines' use of warranties on
commercial avionics equipment that has been cited so often
as the basis for the use of RIWs by the military services.
An ARINC Research Corporation study concluded that RIWs in
commercial avionics procurement are a major factor in producing
higher equipment reliability [Ref. 5:54].
Some factions argue, however, that commercial
experience does not justify the strong support given to it
by the military. These arguments take two forms: (1) the
improvement in reliability of commercial avionics equipment
cannot be totally credited to warranty application, and (2)
too many dissimilarities exist in commercial and military
environments to compare possible warranty results.
The same 1973 report by ARINC Corporation con-
cludes that it is generally recognized that airlines obtain
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a higher reliability than the military achieves with
functionally comparable equipment by a factor of 5:1 to 8:1.
However, it also states: "...The airline's ability to
maintain competition into the equipment production phase
accounts for a major portion of these observed ratios." The
report also concludes. "Most vendors believe that there is
definitely an incentive (from warranties) , but it is diffi-
cult to separate it from the incentive that competition
produces" [Ref. 5:55].
The Council of Defense and Space Industry
Associations (CODSIA) has expressed concern for the differ-
ences in commercial and military warranty applications.
They contend that the sophistication and state-of-the-art
design of military equipment have a direct bearing on the
risk involved on the extended use of warranties. Table I
highlights some of the basic differences between commercial
and military products in the following areas [Ref. 8:2]:
(1) Design of product.




(5) Maintenance and repair.
They also state that commercial warranties impose only
limited financial risk spread over a larger production base
than military warranties.
These arguments tend to dilute, though not destroy,
the justification of warranty usage by the military services




DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEFENSE AND SPACE, AND COMMERCIAL
PRODUCTS, IN THEIR DESIGN, USE, ENVIRONMENTAL
SURROUNDINGS, STORAGE, AND MAINTENANCE
A. DESIGN OF PRODUCT
Designs usually are geared to the following objec
tives in order of priority:
DEFENSE AND SPACE COMMERCIAL
1. Improved performance capa-
bilities involving advance
ments in the state of the
art.
1. Simplicity of equipment
to permit foolproof
operation.







3. Extremely limiting space
and weight restrictions.
4. Reasonable cost.
5. Possible long-time storage
before initial use.
6. Design changes continue
after production begins.
3. Lowest possible cost.
Reasonable equipment life
assuming normal use under
average conditions.
Ease of maintenance.















B. USE OF EQUIPMENT (continued)
DEFENSE AND SPACE
2. Normally used under the
worst possible field con-
ditions at extremes of
temperature, etc.
3. Operated by people who
have little or no motiva-
tion to "preserve" the
equipment.
Because simplicity of
design usually is not a
primary objective, opera-
tion of complex equipment









2. Normally used under the
best possible field con-
ditions designed for the
comfort of the user.
3. Operated by people who
are highly motivated to
"preserve" the equipment
either because of owner-
ship or in the interest
of job retention.
4. Because the equipment was
originally designed with
ease of operation in mind;
this plus the greater
experience and training




The location of ultimate
field use of the equipment
is rarely, if ever, known
and designs must therefore
make provision for extremes
in temperature, humidity,
equilibrium, vibration,
maintenance and repair, etc
Because of the ever- increas-
ing need for greater economy
in defense, there is an
increasing desire for multi-
ple usage of equipment --for
example, aircraft suited to
both land and sea warfare;
communication equipment
usable in aircraft, on the
ground, and under the sea,
etc.
COMMERCIAL
1. The approximate location
of ultimate equipment use
is always known. If the
same TV model is to be
distributed for sale in
Canada and the tropics,
suitable adaptive changes
are made in the products
sent to different areas.
2. Extremes in physical
conditions of use, such
as excessive vibration,







1. Many of the products
purchased by NASA and DoD
are for long-time storage
before actual need and use.
Damage sustained during
this period of idleness is
extremely difficult to
isolate and distinguish
from the causes of mal-
function in later use.
Mishandling during storage
can be a major cause of
later dysfunction.
E. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
DEFENSE AND SPACE








2. Subsequent attempts to
place the blame for
equipment malfunction
where it properly belongs
are either difficult or
impossible
.
3. The cost of improper mainte
nance and repair is exorbi-
tant and the equally high
cost of settling the
responsibility for mal-
function added to it make
the enforcement of express
warranties non-cost




before sale and use





Usually easy to determine
whether malfunction of
equipment was because of






2. Reliability Community Viewpoints
Within the Navy, various reliability and maintaina-
bility (R§M) groups concern themselves with the problems of
equipment reliability and the most efficient and cost effec-
tive methods to improve it. It is within this R§M community
that the RIW controversy is centered.
An attempt to simplify the numerous and confusing
issues was made during interviews and literature review.
As a result, the fundamental philosophic differences began
to appear. Both the proponents and opponents of RIW usage
are in agreement on what actions are necessary to improve
equipment reliability. Briefly, those actions include the
improvement of product design with more emphasis on R§M and
the development of more suitable test and evaluation pro-
cedures to stimulate extended field usage. They also agree
that these improvements can be accomplished with reasonable
success
.
The philosophies began to diverge, however, regarding
how to accomplish the desired actions in the government
acquisition arena. The proponents of the RIW expound the
belief that a warranty provides a needed incentive for the
contractor to improve R§M design and testing, not as a substi
tute for, but in addition to other government project manage-
ment. Those opposing argue that RIWs provide no real
incentive to a contractor and that money spent on RIW clauses




The basis for these philosophies lies in the attitudes
of the personalities involved. These attitudes reflect years
of differing experiences and are set deep enough that change
will prove difficult. A brief examination of both factions
in detail should bear this out.
a. Proponents' Viewpoints
The proponents argue that the government is
motivated to buy a warranty to shift a considerable part of
the technical and administrative burden in design improvement,
test and evaluation, active fleet failure surveillance, and
identification of design shortcomings from the government to
the contractor. To the degree that the contractor can reduce
fleet failures, the less fleet time and money are spent in
downtime and maintenance actions [Ref. 12:18]. An engineer
at NAVAIR exemplified this theory by his statement, "No one
in the Navy can design a (modern aircraft) hydraulic pump."
His approach was based upon his experience in working with
hydraulic design. He agreed that the ability for proper
equipment design resided with contractors and that proper
incentive was necessary to extract the contractors' best
effort [Ref. 9].
Another NAVAIR interviewee provided a slightly
different approach for the necessity of warranties. Based
on his experience in navigation and flight control systems
engineering, he related RIWs to quality control in the manu-
facturing process. Given that an equipment met reliability
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specifications under the most stringent test and evaluation
procedures, he pointed out that the testing was usually
performed on a prototype or very early production models.
However, because the production process can only degrade
reliability, the initial test and evaluation would not usually
reflect true field reliability. Therefore, an incentive to
ensure the maintenance of good quality control throughout
production was necessary. According to this interviewee, a
warranty contract was a quite logical incentive because it
forced concern for future equipment repair onto the con-
tractor, at the expense of possible profits [Ref. 3],
Another NAVAIR engineer directly involved with
RIW development expressed a similar viewpoint in a slightly
different manner. He voiced the opinion that the "New Look"
program (buying additional design and testing with close
government involvement) allowed the contractor to forget
reliability requirements once an equipment was accepted and
production and delivery commenced. This, he considered,
would result in degradation of field reliability,
b. Opponents' Viewpoints
Those who oppose the warranty concept base their
opposition on the theory that adequate incentive is not pro-
vided or necessary to accomplish acceptable reliability. A
reliability engineer at NAVMAT expressed strong doubts about
the effects a warranty clause has on a contractor's efforts
or ability to improve reliability. In his words, "(contrac-
tors) don't have a 1000-hr. MTBF engineer, a 2000-hr. MTBF
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engineer, and a 3000-hr. MTBF engineer that they can pick
from according to how much (government) pays. They are doing
the best they can (to increase reliability)" [Ref. 5].
That engineer's opinion follows closely with the
reference to automobile warranties made earlier in this
chapter and that of CODSIA. In a letter to the U.S. Army
Procurement Research Office, CODSIA stated:
The attitude of the government ... is that increased
reliability is something solely within contractors'
control, and that contractors are failing because of
lack of sufficient motivation to build products with
the necessary reliability..." [Ref. 8:3].
Another viewpoint, although unsubstantiated by
fact or experience, was quite often encountered. Many of
the R§M personnel interviewed expressed the fear that the
addition of RIW clauses could lead to contractors • taking
double profits. According to the advocates of this theory,
the contractor could "hold back" on initial equipment relia-
bility while profiting on the production contract and then
quickly improve field reliability up to contract goals,
earning substantial profit under the RIW repair contract.
Although no cases of this type of action have been detected,
the logic appears to be valid and should not be ignored
[Ref. 12:46].
3. Case Studies
The results of completed and in-progress RIWs are
of great concern to the organizations involved. Unfortunately,
the RIW experiment has not been easy to control and the results
of warranties have not been a simple matter to analyze. Four
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brief case studies are presented to exemplify variations of
warranty success and the difficulties in determining the
extent of success.
a. Navy 2171 Gyro
The Navy's 2171 gyroscope was the first equip-
ment for which a warranty was purchased. Of the Navy's 3200
units, 800 were covered under a Failure Free Warranty contract;
the remaining 2800 were under a repair contract. The contract
had a goal of increasing the warranted gyros' MTBF from 400 to
520 operating hours over a 1500-hour or five-year period.
Interim reports on the warranty were favorable. The 520-hour
MTBF goal was achieved two years earlier than predicted.
During the same period, the MTBF of non-warranted gyros
improved to 442 hours [Ref. 6:176]. Because of lower than
predicted utilization, however, the contract was extended
for two months beyond the five-year cutoff, at an added
cost.
Over the five-year period, only 990,000 operating
hours were achieved. As a result, if the original conditions
of the contract had been followed, the RIW would have cost
the Navy $166,000 more than non-RIW support. However, with
the contract extension and other considerations, a NAVAIR
study estimated the total savings to be $465,000 [Ref. 6:
APP. A]. To add to the confusion, a later RAND Corporation
study calculated the overall savings to be only $51,000 on
a contract of just over $4.5 million. The RAND study also
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pointed out that LSI conducted roughly 50,000 hours of
continuous laboratory testing during the contract period.
This raises the question of what the cost and result would
have been had the test program been financed independent of
a warranty [Ref. 11:46],
b. Air Force F-lll Gyro
The Air Force's F-lll gyroscope was the next
major contract involving a warranty. The original design
and procurement was by General Electric in the early 1960 's.
The first 534 units were supplied by GE under a sole-source
contract. In 1969, the Air Force concluded that low relia-
bility of the gyros necessitated a new procurement using
competition. Lear Siegler won that contract for 601 gyros.
The new gyros were warranted against failure in that LSI
would repair or replace any unit that failed, though no MTBF
guarantee or goal was specified. The warranty period ended
in 1976.
The non-warranted GE gyros were experiencing an
MTBF of 681 operating hours. LSI expected to improve their
gyros' MTBF to 1494 operating hours. Many problems were
experienced with this warranty, most of which were attributed
to the low utilization of the F-lll aircraft. Although the
goal was not met, during October 1973 an MTBF of 1214 hours
was achieved on the warranted gyros. The non-warranted
gyros still in use were experiencing an MTBF of 749 hours
during the same period.
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Two major factors, not related to the warranty,
may have accounted for the improvement in MTBF of the warranted
gyros over the non-warranted GE gyros. First, the warranted
gyros were produced under competition by a different contractor.
This may have been the necessary motivation for improved relia-
bility design. Second, extensive additional testing was
conducted during the year before the warranty period. This
augmented test program probably improved the gyro's reliability
and could have been duplicated without a warranty [Ref. 11:49],
c. Navy F-14 Hydraulic Pump
One of the most successful RIW contracts to date
is the Navy's F-14 hydraulic pump with ABEX Corporation.
The contract was signed in April 1973 and provides coverage
through 982,560 pump operating hours or April 1983, whichever
occurs first. The original contract covered 258 pumps and
has been amended to cover later lots of F-14 production.
The contract specified a reliability growth from an MTBF
of 500 hours to an MTBF of 750 hours. The original warranty
cost was $846,444.
An Aviation Supply Office contract review published
in October 1977 reported the following significant results
[Ref. 15:iii] :





(2) Reliability Growth (1973-1977)
RIW: From 500 hours MTBF to 1250 hours MTBF.
Non-RIW: From 500 hours MTBF to 590 hours MTBF
(3) Fleet Support
RIW: 2.41 of total hydraulic systems NORS
(Not Operationally Ready, Supply) allocated to
its engine -driven pumps supported with 25%
spares
.
Non-RIW: 41% of total hydraulic systems NORS
(A7-E) allocated to its engine-driven pumps
supported with 75% spares.
The report concludes, "This RIW contract has been the most
cost effective support alternative available to the Navy"
[Ref. 15:44].
The Aviation Supply Office and NAVAIR have judged
this warranty as highly successful to this point; however,
it has not been problem- free . An interview with the NAVAIR
engineer on the project revealed two problems [Ref. 9]. First,
it was his opinion that the warranty was put into force too
early in the acquisition cycle. The warranty went into effect
after delivery of some production units but prior to completion
of the aircraft qualification testing. Waiting until the
aircraft had completed qualification tests before enforcing
the warranty would have, in his opinion, reduced some of the
efforts in solving various technical problems. Second,
problems have existed with configuration control and failure
reporting. He stressed the importance of NAVAIR and Grumman
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Aircraft Corporation (the prime contractor) being made aware
of failure problems experienced with all aircraft systems
and the need for control of equipment configuration. Early
in the warranty period, failed units were being shipped
directly back to ABEX for repair and the reporting system
was not effective. Neither Grumman nor NAVAIR were made
aware of some early technical difficulties, the knowledge of
which should have been widely distributed. At the time of
the interview (July 1979) , the reporting problems were less
frequent.
d. Navy AN/AYK-14 (V) Standard Airborne Computer
The Reliability Assurance Warranty (RAW) covering
the AN/AYK-14 (V) is one of the Navy's newest warranty contract
options. It covers the computer, ground support equipment,
laboratory equipment and software through a specified
elapsed operating time or a period of five years. (The
elapsed time varies from 2200 to 5000 hours by equipment.)
The contractor will provide materials and services required
for total maintenance/improvement of all equipment and soft-
ware. Both intermediate and depot maintenance will be pro-
vided for.
Although the warranty provision of the contract is
not yet in force, the Primary Contracting Officer (PCO) is
seeing results. He stated that pre-production equipment has
displayed "astounding" reliability. MTBF has exceeded that
of similar equipment in use by quantum steps [Ref. 7].
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The AN/AYK-14 (V) project is also the first
acquisition to which the "new look" program has been applied.
Although the "new look" program is considered by its developers
to be compatible with warranties, the simultaneous application
of two unproven programs to accomplish the same goals will
make analysis difficult.
e. Observations on the Case Studies
The four case studies characterize many situations
found in the RIW program. The key points intended are:
(1) The result of most of the programs has
indicated a definite increase in MTBF.
(2) In three of the four preceding cases, none
have been problem-free.
(3) In three of the cases, other factors are
present which could also have influenced the improvement in
reliability.
(4) The actual costs involved cannot always be
agreed upon. This also raised questions about the cost
effectiveness of RIWs when compared to other methods of
reliability improvement.
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF RIWS TO SHIPBOARD SYSTEMS
Most notably absent in RIW development has been the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) . The RIW has yet to be
applied to shipboard systems. There are several reasons for
the lack of RIW development in this area which were brought
out in discussions with NAVMAT and NAVSEA personnel.
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1. Problems Inhibiting Shipboard Application of RIWs
The most evident problems with warranties on shipboard
equipments are of a logistics nature. The logistics require-
ments of a warranty are not generally compatible with the
self-sufficiency requirements of a Navy ship. Transportation
of failed components to a contractor-designated repair facility
is not usually available to a ship at sea. Additionally,
the necessity for the repair of failed equipments while a
ship is at sea is a real concern. Unauthorized repair by
non-contractor personnel might be difficult if repair parts
and expertise are not available, and its accomplishment
would likely void any warranty.
Another concern expressed by a NAVMAT engineer is
one of configuration control. If the RIW provided for con-
tractor improvements of warranted equipments, it is possible
to have two sub-components on board a ship which are not
internally identical. This could make the emergency repair
procedure known as "cannibalization" (making one operable
unit from the parts of two or more failed units) impossible
[Ref. 10].
One final issue concerns a characteristic of success-
ful RIW application. It is generally accepted that in order
for an RIW to be profitable for both the contractor and the
government, a large number of systems should be purchased
under the warranty. The fact that ships are not purchased
in large numbers usually results in major systems being con-
tracted in small numbers or even one-of-a-kind. According
61

to most people experienced in RIW administration, this
makes warranty application to these systems infeasible.
A number of considerations internal to NAVSEA have
also impeded the expansion of RIWs to ships. The lack of
experience in RIW application and development became evident
during discussions with NAVSEA Reliability and Maintainability
(R§M) personnel. An interviewee at NAVSEA stated that the
Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) was given responsi-
bility for NAVSEA RIW contracts through a Support Agreement
between them [Ref. 1]. The applicable paragraphs of that
agreement have been cited in Chapter IV, section B-3. In
fact, that agreement has not been approved and no RIW
responsibilities have been passed to SPCC. That organization
does not have an engineering staff to undertake warranty
structuring; nor is SPCC involved in the design, development,
or contracting of major systems. The application of RIWs
requires interface with all of those processes, which places
SPCC in a poor position to structure and contract this type
of warranty.
Another R§M group at NAVSEA expressed considerable
interest in exploring RIW applications. Their efforts to
pursue the matter were hindered, however, by a lack of
guidance or understanding of RIW development. There appeared
to be little comprehension regarding which organizations
should become involved. When questioned about warranties,
one interviewee responsed, "We used to write them into the
specs years ago but 'they' always scratched them off, so
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we just quit asking." When asked who "they" were, he
did not know.
While these two examples are extreme, they were
encountered in the offices of the organization that should be
taking the first look at warranty candidates.
2. The Basics of RIW selection Applied to Shipboard Systems
A review of NAVSEA- sponsored electronic and navigation
systems, both operational and planned, with R§M engineers pro-
vided interesting results. In this review, very basic criteria
were used in the screening process for possible RIW application.
The "basic" RIW questions considered here precede
the often published and normally accepted list of equipment
characteristics as selection criteria. According to one
member of the NAVMAT reliability staff, the first question
which must be asked is, "What is the maintenance plan?"
[Ref . 2] . A NAVAIR engineer breaks that down into more
pragmatic questions: "How does it work? What is likely to
fail? How many spares are needed? Who should repair it?
How can it be shipped?" [Ref. 3]. This is a much simplified
view of the warranty decision, but it accurately depicts the
line of thinking an engineer must pursue to start the
decision process.
The systems reviewed with NAVSEA R§M personnel in-
cluded several Ships Inertial Navigation Systems (SINS)
,
both deployed and under development; and computer hardware
deployed on the 688 class nuclear-powered submarines. This
includes the AN/UYK-7 computer, the IBM RD-281 tape drive,
and other input/output devices.
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The SINS equipment is all repaired at the depot
level. Underway maintenance is limited to major component
exchange because the technology prohibits bench repair
aboard ship. In some cases, two complete units are operational
at all times, and a third unit is stored in special shipping
containers for rapid exchange. Failed units are stored in
the containers and shipped to the depot when the ship
enters port. The complete systems are divided into two or
three major components which cannot be broken down further
except at the designated repair facility. Also of interest
is the fact that some currently deployed models have experi-
enced an MTBF that is only 25% of design specification,
according to NAVSEA engineers
.
The maintenance plans for the shipboard computer
systems have many similar characteristics. The AN/UYK-7
computer, manufactured by Sperry-Univac, has multiple installa-
tions aboard several ship types. Although an exact number
of planned installations was not available, it was estimated
at over 1000. Many of the computer peripheral devices
including the IBM RD-281 tape drive, the Sperry OJ-172 I/O
terminal, and the Raytheon OU-83 central signal data converter
are "off-the-shelf" components purchased in large quantities.
The maintenance plan calls for contractor repair under a
standard maintenance contract. No warranties were supplied
or purchased with these equipments.
Both the navigational equipment and the computer
systems display many of the characteristics specified for
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RIW candidates. The logistics problems associated with
shipboard installation will presumably be overcome under
the current Depot/Contractor maintenance plans and would
be little additional burden under warranty considerations.
These equipments also adhere to the classic requirements.
They are generally self-contained, field-testable, and
transportable. They are also easily adaptable to elapsed-
time indicators and should be subject to high utilization.
C . SUMMARY
Section A presented various viewpoints concerning the
effectiveness of RIWs . The foundation of RIW development
in the military environment lies in the commercial warranty
field and the commercial airline industry experience.
Commercial warranties have generally been considered as a
protective device for the consumer and commercial airlines
have benefitted with higher equipment reliability. However,
the argument has been made that commercial warranties provide
the most protection to the manufacturers and do not necessarily
motivate them to produce a better product. Additionally,
differences in the specifications and operating environments,
not warranty usage, of commercial and military equipments can
explain the apparent reliability inequalities.
The members of the reliability community are also
divided as to the effects of warranties on contractors.
Proponents of warranties cite the profit motivation of
RIWs as the prime mover in producing reliability improvements:
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improvements resulting from better design and more intense
quality control by contractors. Industry representatives
and some military factions argue that warranties provide
little incentive and are less cost effective than other methods
of buying improvements
.
The case studies exemplify another aspect of the warranty
controversy. Some warranty applications have apparently been
successful in providing motivation to contractors and saving
money for the government. However, in some applications,
other factors have also influenced the results, making warranty
evaluation difficult or inconclusive.
Section B examined the application of RIWs to shipboard
equipments. RIWs have not been applied to shipboard equip-
ments because of a number of problems. Primarily, the logistics
difficulties in support of operating ships have tended to
inhibit warranty possibilities. Supply lines are often too
long or inconsistent to transport failed components or replace-
ment spares on a regular and timely basis. Additionally,
shipboard systems are usually purchased in quantities too
small to make warranty application profitable for contractors.
An examination of some equipments being deployed and to
be procured provided ideas for consideration. The advanced
technology of navigation and computer equipment has resulted
in the necessity for depot or contractor maintenance, reducing
shipboard repair to major component exchange. Also, multiple
installations and standardization aboard ship have increased
the total number of each system procured by the Navy. This
66

means the logistics problems previously associated with
warranty repair are present with current maintenance plans
and must be solved, and quantities are high enough to make
profitable warranties feasible. These equipments also
possess other characteristics desirable for warranty
application.
Chapter VI will present conclusions drawn from the
material in Chapters IV and V as well as possible recom-
mendations for further warranty evaluation.
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The Navy does not have firm policy guidance on which
to conduct effective warranty trial applications
.
The Naval Air Systems Command was the only major
Navy organization for which written policy and implementation
guidance was available. Although the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (M,RA§L) , the Naval Material Command,
and the Naval Sea Systems Command have addressed the subject
in correspondence and have voiced opinions, none have produced
firm policy or guidance to assist their internal staffs or
subordinate orginations in the application or use of RIWs
.
2 A firm judgment on the effectiveness of the Reliability
Improvement Warranty is yet to be made
.
Analysis of completed RIW programs has indicated
success in most cases. Significant increases in MTBFs have
been accomplished at an apparent reduction in total costs.
Although many programs have experienced problems, no RIW
has been judged a complete failure.
However, many valid questions have been raised con-
cerning the validity of the analyses. Most experts will
agree that many of the costs of RIW application and administra-
tion have not been quantified. Also, the effects of RIWs
in MTBF improvement cannot be distinguished from the effects
of other variables which cannot be removed from the experi-
ments. Finally, it is impossible to accurately determine the
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success of the overall RIW effort when each program is analyzed
individually by the program's sponsoring organization.
3. Reliability Improvement Warranty application to
shipboard systems is feasible on a limited, trial basis
.
The shipboard systems examined during this research
met many of the fundamental criteria for RIW application.
No indication was given during interviews with NAVSEA per-
sonnel that RIW application was considered as an alternative
to depot or standard repair contract support.
4. The Naval Sea Systems Command has an apparent lack
of understanding or appreciation for the possible benefits of
Reliability Improvement Warranty usage .
Although the reluctance to enter warranty experi-
mentation is founded upon some very real and valid concerns,
the potential for warranty implementation is available on a
limited basis. However, for that potential to be realized,
the proper emphasis must be placed at the level of organiza-
tion equipped to make knowledgeable warranty decisions.
This includes management, contracting, and engineering per-
sonnel. Those R§M engineering personnel interviewed displayed
an interest in the possible benefits of applying warranty
provisions but lacked impetus and guidance for developing or
staffing initial warranty proposals.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The trial application of Reliability Improvement
Warranties should continue on a controlled and limited basis.
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The RIW controversy cannot be solved if trial applica-
tion is not continued. However, care must be exercised in
controlling the application and in evaluating the results of
RIWs
.
More centralized management of RIW experimentation
should allow for improvement in the understanding and appli-
cation of the information obtained. This improvement is
necessary to properly develop and implement future RIW policy.
2
.
The Naval Material Command should develop RIW
policies and functional capabilities which will allow it to
become the Navy's central control and evaluation point for
warranty experimentation
.
The Naval Material Command is the logical organization
to control the policies of the Navy's RIW program and evaluate
the overall results. Although the operational decisions
remain with the Systems Commands, NAVMAT should consolidate
and evaluate the Navy's overall RIW success. The current
lack of firm policy and organized information have resulted in
uncontrolled experimentation and a lack of objective analysis
at the NAVMAT level. To correct this, tighter control must
be placed upon the application of RIWs and NAVMAT must develop
the ability to collect data and objectively analyze the results.
3. The application of RIWs to shipboard systems should
be considered as an alternative to depot or contractor repair .
The NAVMAT should coordinate with NAVSEA regarding the
limited application of RIWs to shipboard systems. If accom-
plished under controlled conditions on properly selected






C. OBSERVATIONS AND ITEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following observations and suggestions for further
research are the opinions of this researcher gained during
the compilation of this study.
1. The proper concept and objectives of RIWs is not
uniformly understood within the Navy's reliability community.
The "improvement" aspect of the RIW term overshadows other
possible benefits, e.g., contractor incentivization and risk-
sharing. Many interviewees expressed more than mild oppo-
sition to RIWs but were in favor of other warranty types. The
Long-Term Warranty used by NAVAIR appears to be an effective
method of overcoming this stigma. Therefore, DOD should
consider changing the universal term to long-term warranty.
2. The NAVAIR displayed considerable advancement in
developing the details of applying and administering RIW
contracts. Training of other systems commands, by NAVAIR,
regarding proper RIW management could reduce "growing pains"
in the expansion of trial applications. The NAVAIR draft
instruction for RIW management shows potential as an excellent
example for others to follow.
3. The organizations contacted for this research dis-
played definite bias either "for" or "against" the RIW
concept. The objective evaluation of RIW programs cannot be
accomplished unless these biases are overcome.
4. The RIW concept is firmly entrenched at the
congressional and DOD levels as a viable program for
improving reliability in military systems. Until valid
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facts are produced which disprove this concept in favor of
an alternative, the trial application of RIWs will continue.
Only improved management of the program, at all levels, will
foster a correct evaluation and benefit the government.
5. The accurate and timely evaluation of RIW trials is
one of the most perplexing problems which face the decision
makers. This researcher is unaware of any evaluative model
being used to improve or standardize the evaluation of RIW
applications. Additional research for development of an
evaluative model which will improve the ability to compare
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